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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OP THE STATE OP UTAH
SCM LAND COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

. ]
Case No. 19172

WATKINS & FABER, and
WALTER P. PABER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
COMBINED PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
MOTION TO AMEND PLEADINGS
TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE

PREFATORY STATEMENT
Because W. Chris Wicker, who tried the case, now
practices in Reno, Nevada, and Brian W. Burnett, who handled
the appeal, is now employed by the Utah State Attorney General,
Walter P. Faber, Jr., a sole practitioner, Pro Se, and as
the sole remaining member of Watkins & Faber, files this
Combined Pe.tition for Rehearing and Motion to Amend Pleadings
to Conform to the Evidence.
The principal legal ground for rehearing and motion
to amend to conform to the evidence is that this Court should,
pursuant to Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
grant judgment to Watkins & Faber because of the undisputed
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"2"

evidence of mutual mistake by the parties who signed the
written lease in the belief that other adjacent space then
occupied by a third party on a month-to-month basis would
be available to Watkins & Paber within six months after
the lease was signed.

This document combines the requests

because common elements apply to both the petition and motion.

|

DISCUSSION
Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
4

provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled>
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
I
Although the theory of mutual mistake was not raised at
trial or initially on appeal^ when Justice Zimmerman asked
about mutual mistake during oral argument, it became obvious
i

that the theory of mutual mistake applied to the case and
that such theory had up to that time been overlooked by
counsel.

The fact that a legal theory or defense has not
i

been discerned by counsel at trial does not prohibit the
granting of judgment by the Supreme Court under Rule 54(c)
if the evidence was presented.

Rule 1 of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure provides that the Rules apply to the
Supreme Court as well as to the trial courts.
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-3The Utah Supreme Court has previously considered
the application of Rule 54(c) to the trial courts.

See

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179
(Utah 1983); Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction Company,
Inc., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984); Tebbs, Smith & Associates
v. Brooks, 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1986).

The Utah

Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the question
whether the Supreme Court should grant relief based on the
evidence received by the trial court, even though the parties
had not presented to the trial court an applicable legal
theory which was first discerned during argument before
the Supreme Court.
Under such circumstances, appellate courts in
other jurisdictions have rendered judgment under Rule 54(c)
even though the applicable theory was not recognized until
the case was before the appellate court.

In Massachusetts

Bonding & Insurance Company v. New York, 259 P.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1958) .the court reversed the trial court and held that
the United States was entitled to a priority claim pursuant
to a theory which was presented for the first time to the
appellate court.

The United States had presented its case

at two previous evidentiary hearings and had not argued
to the referee at the first hearing or to the district court
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<

at the second hearing that the United States was entitled
to a priority claim based upon a lien under the Internal
Revenue Code. The appellate court allowed the theory and
stated:
[A]s Rule 54(c) F.R.Civ.Proc., points out, it
is the courtfs responsibility to award relief
required by the facts on any proper ground,
regardless of the theories urged by the parties.
Thus on numerous occasions . . . we, as well as
other courts, have granted relief on legal
theories not presented by the parties to the
district court. 259 P.2d g 40.
In a similar case, United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51 (1958)
the United States Supreme Court affirmed recovery by the
United States on a lien theory never presented to the

\

<

i

district court but granted by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in modifying the judgment of the district court.
See, Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 732 P.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1984); Industrial Dev. Bd. of Section, AL

v. Fugua Industries,

Inc., 522 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1975).
The holdings in the above cases are consistent
with the stated purpose of Rule 54(c) which is:
. . . to [allow] relief to be given that
is consistent with what is shown to be necessary
to compensate the parties or remedy the situation
without regard to the constraints of the antiquated
and rigid forms of action.
10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil 2d § 2662 at 133 (2d Ed. 1983).

The Eighth Circuit
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-5Court of Appeals stated the philosophy underlying Rule 54(c)
as "the essentials of due process and of fair play.

They

assure to every person his day in court before judgment
is pronounced against him."

Sylvan Beach, Inc. v. Koch,

140 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1944).
Professor Moore states that:
Rule 15 provides liberally for amendment of
pleadings and supplemental pleadings to the end
that litigation may be disposed of on the merits.
Rule 54(c) continues the story by providing that,
except as to a judgment by default which shall
not be different in kind from or exceed the amount
prayed, every other final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it
is rendered is entitled.
6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, MooreTs Federal Practice,
§ 54.60 at 54-293 (2nd Ed. 1986).

The benefits of Rule

54(c) are available to both plaintiffs and defendants.
Id. at § 54.62 pg. 54-315.
In the instant case, this Court pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure can and should grant relief
to defendant from the agreement because of the mutual mistake.
As shown above, this Court has the responsibility to grant
relief to defendant pursuant to the theory of mutual mistake
even though this theory was not presented to the trial court
and was first mentioned by one of the members of the Supreme
Court.

The only requirement is that the evidence was presented
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-6to the trial court as occurred in this case.

Included

in the Addendum hereto are pages from the trial transcript
identifying such evidence.

I

The evidence in this case is undisputed that the
parties signed the lease on the mutual understanding that
IML was going to vacate the additional space needed by

i

defendant and that the lease would not have been signed
by Watkins & Paber without that promise.

When IML did not

vacate the space as understood and relied on by the parties,

^

the fact of mutual mistake was established.
In Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wood By-Products,
Inc., 695 P.2d 409, 411-412 (Id. Ct. App. 1984) the Idaho

*

Court stated that "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties,
at the time of contracting, share a misconception about
a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they base their
bargain."

''

See Mat-Sue/Blackard/Stephan & Sons v. Alaska,

674 P.2d 1101 (Alaska 1982); Gardner v. Meiling, 572 P.2d
i

1012 (OR 1977).
In the instant case the evidence is undisputed
that there would have been no agreement except for the
assumption relied on by the parties.

Therefore, pursuant

to Rule 54(c) this Court should determine that the lease
agreement between the parties was subject to rescission.
(
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-7There are also several other uncertainties in
the CourtTs opinion that ought to be clarified.

This

Court's decision characterizes Watkins & PaberTs position
as an attempt to modify a written lease.

That does not

accurately state Watkins & PaberTs argument which was that
the failure to perform the unwritten promise was simply
a failure of collateral consideration and was not an
argument that the lease should have been modified to include
the unwritten promise.

The CourtTs decision does not clarify

the question whether collateral consideration is required
to be in written form under either the Parole Evidence Rule
or the Statute of Frauds.

For example, the situation of

collateral consideration may be described as a case wherein
two friends are negotiating a written contract concerning
a particular commercial transaction and to overcome the
reluctance by one party to sign the contract, the other
orally promises to give the reluctant party a paid trip
to Europe within six months, but after the signing reneges
on his oral promise.

It is not unusual that such a promise

would not be included as a written provision of the contract
between friends but would be collateral consideration, the
failure of which would allow rescission.

That is the

essence of the situation in this case.
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-8In addition, the Court's opinion does not treat
the irreconcilable conflict between two jury instructions,
one of which required the finding of and full performance
of a detailed oral contract before the written lease could
begin even though the required performance of the so-called

.

oral contract was not to have been performed until six months
after the beginning of the lease term.

Those irreconcilable

instructions wrongly required the jury to return the verdict
that it did.

,

That point should be resolved by this Court.

This Court should grant the relief requested or
remand this matter for entry of judgment in favor of Watkins
& Paber on the grounds of mutual mistake and issue an order
under Rule 15(b) that the pleadings be amended to conform
to the evidence.
DATED this 9th day of January, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,

(A JOJMA

/\

^raluj. (Is.

WALTER P. PABER, JR., Pro Sf
and for Watkins & Paber
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-9CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of
the foregoing Combined Petition for Rehearing and Motion
to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence to Henry K.
Chai II, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent, 11th Floor, Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, postage prepaid, this 9th day
of January, 1987-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, JUDGE PRESIDING
oOo

SCM LAND COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

)
Case No. C81-8870

vs.
TRIAL ON APPEAL
WATKINS & FABER and
WALTER P. FABER, JR.,
Defendants.

)

Thursday, February 17, 1983

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff;

For the Defendants

HENRY K. CHAI II, ESQ.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Phone: (801) 521-9000
W. CHRIS WICKER, ESQ.
WATKINS & FABER
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 486-5634

s-rx

••W V - '^'~ s-*--'/ 'f- ^HARYN KELLY, CSR #134
W '
.^^/^^M^fficialnaep^rtair

m
^tfjfc**
^V7T
U<

E

ij
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1

.A

Walter P. Faber, Jr., 2102 East 33rd South,

2

Salt Lake City, Utah.

3

•

Q

Where are you now employed?

4

A

Watkins & Faber.

5 I

Q

What is Watkins & Faber?

6

A

It's a law firm.

7

Q

What is your position with Watkins & Faber?

8

A

I am the managing partner.

9

THE COURT:

Excuse m e , M r . Wicker;

10 ' right to the point.

If the jury were here and this was your

11 I case in chief that all might be helpful.
12

Why don't you get

But I know M r . Fabejr

and I know his background, and I know what this case is

13 I about.

So why don't we get right to the meat of the case.

14

MR. WICKER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. WICKER:

17

Q

Okay.
Meat of the issue, I should say.
Okay.

Drawing your attention to June of 1979, what was

18

the status of the Watkins & Faber lease in the Newhouse

19

Building?

20

A

It was due to expire on June 30th, 1979.

21

Q

Now, at that time did Watkins & Faber intend to

22 renew a lease for space in the Newhouse Building?
23

A

The answer is yes or no.

24 I

Q

What do you mean by "yes or no"?

25 |

A

We had not enough room at that time.
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We needed

f>1fk

two or three more offices.

And when I talked with

Mr. Swinton, who was then the building manager for Mr.
Fischer, about it, I told him that we had to have more space
if we were going to stay in the building.

So the question

was whether we could have more space on the sixth floor or
whether we'd have to move.
....

Q

i . .

...._.

When you approached Mr. Swinton with that idea

what was his response?
MR. CHAI:

Your Honor, I am going to, for the record,

make my objection on hearsay, parol evidence, statute of
frauds.
THE COURT:

Well, I understand.

You don't need to

make any objections.
MR. CHAI:
THE COURT:
MR. CHAI:
THE COURT:

Okay.
Just save that for when the jury's here.
Okay.
This is just an attempt to determine

whether or not your objection is well taken.
MR. CHAI:
THE COURT:
MR. WICKER:

Okay.
Proceed, Mr. Wicker.
Okay, Your Honor.

When I am talking to

Mr. Faber and speaking of him and using the word "you", I
am referring to Mr. Faber and the firm Watkins & Faber, if
that 1 s all right.
THE COURT:

All right.
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' > Ak

Q

(By Mr. Wicker)

What was Mr. Sainton's response

when you raised the idea of the need for more space?
A

Well, we discussed the fact that I.M.L. was

on a inonth-to--month te nancy

on the ba lance of thLe sixth

floor and that I.M.L. was going to be movi rig to the eleventh
floor shortly and that additional ispa ce on the s ixth floor
would be available.
He thought it could be worked out, and we then
arrived at a rental figure for the then present space in
606 Newhouse Building.
Mr. Swinton left and, I think several days later,
came back with a proposed lease.

And I told Mr. Swinton at

that time that I wouldn't sign the lease until I had a
definite promise of the additional space on the sixth floor.
Q

At th^t time what was Mr. Swinton1s response?

A

He didn't think there would be any problem, but

that he couldn't make that decision, he'd have to contact
the building owner, and the building owner, Mr. Fischer,
would have to make the decision.
Q

Did you ever have occasion to speak to Mr. Fische

about the need for more space?
A

Yes.

Q

When was that?

A

I spoke to him about it two times in the first

part of July of 1979.
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1

Q

What was the substance of the first conversation?)

2

A

I think the first one, as I

3

Q

I might ask you first, excuse me, who was present}

4

—

and where did the conversation take place?
A

5

The conversation took place in the hall, out in

6

the sixth floor hall.

Mr* Swinton and I think Mr. Fischer

7

were coming up to see me, and I was leasing, or something,

8

at that time.

9

Q

And what was the substance of the conversation?

10

A

I told them that we, Watkins & Faber, had to

11

have a promise of the additional office space on the sixth,

12

floor or we'd have to move from the building.

13

Mr. Fischer

said that would be no problem, he'd promise the office space
i_

,

14

Q

Was there anything else said in that conversation)?

15

A

Yes.

16

We talked about what portion of the sixth

floor we'd take, and I said we'd take —

we couldn't be

17 exact, because we were talking about putting a new entryway
18 in the hall, across the hall on the sixth floor, so that
19 Watkins & Faber would take what would be the northwest
20 corner of the floor there.
21

That would be a big corner office, a little

22 office, and I think there were two other offices close.

And

23 then we'd have to put just one little partition across the
24 hall in the space that I.M.L. was then occupying so that we'd
25 end up with three offices, I believe, and at that time a
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1

little storage room that was there at the end on 606, and

2

we'd put a new partition across the main hall on the sixth

3

floor.

4
5

Q

At that first conversation with Mr. Fischer

was there any discussion of time element involved?

6

A

Yes.

I asked him when it would be available.

7 j He said that it would be available within two or three
8 I months, he thought, but no later than the end of December,
9 I 1979.

10 I

Q

Again, in the first conversation with

H | Mr. Swinton was there any discussion of rental rates or
12 j anything of that nature?
13 :

A

14 j rate.

The rental rate for new space would be the going
That was whatever they were renting space for at that

15 time, which would be at the end of December, '79,
16

Q

Was that all the substance of the conversation,

17 I or was there anything else discussed?
18

A

I think that was all except that either I said

19 I'd be back in a little while or they said they'd be back in
>0 a little while.
H

In any case, we met later in my office.

!2 Mr. Swinton and Mr. Fischer came in.
3

Q

When was that?

4

A

I can't remember if it was that same day, but

5 I think it was a few days later.

Because something happened
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1

that we couldn't get together.

2

July when we finally got together.

3

Mr. Fischer came into the office.

4
5

Q

But it was on the 9th day of
And Mr. Swinton and

When you say the office, are you referring to

your office at Watkins & Faber?

6

A

In the office at Watkins & Faber, in my office.

7

Q

Was there anybody else present at that time?

8

A

Yes. Mr. Jim Arrowsmith.

9

Q

What was the substance of the conversation at

10

that time, on July 6th?

11
12

A

We talked about whether I.M.L. would be moving

and how their problems were going on the eleventh floor.

13 Because I .M.L. intended to vaca te the sixth floor and move
14 to the el<sventh floor.
15 teilancy .

They were on a month-to--month

And I talked •vith Mr. Glenn Goodrich, the vice

16 preside nt of I.M.L., about it, and he said that they were
17 proceeding.
18

If I may just state an aside here about the

19 eleventh floor, the eleventh floor had been the offices of
20 Samuel Newhouse.

The hardware in there, as I recall it, is

21 gold plated or something.
22 very ornate wood.

They had mirrors all over and some

And I believe I.M.L. was trying to work

23 that into whatever they were doing.

But they had carpet up

24 there and had done some other things.

They were working on

25 it.
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Anyway, as we talked this over with Mr. Fischer,

1
2

at that time I told him —

3

two weeks.

4

had the definite promise, and we had to have the date.

5

Because Reed Watkins was on sort of a time basis at that

6

time and Mr. Barry Bergen was a new associate who was coming.

7

And all of the offices that we had then were completely used,

8

and we were having two attorneys operate out of our supply

9

room that we were trying to use as an office.

10

At least, it sat on my desk for

And I told him I would not sign it unless we

I told that to Mr. Fischer and Mr. Swinton at

11

that time, that we had to have the space and the promise of

12

it.

13

end of December, 1979, that we would then sign a written

14

lease for the additional space at the going rate.

He said at that time again that it would be done by the

15 said okay.

And I

So I then signed the lease, and I think that

16 Mr. Swinton had previously signed it. We took it out to my
17 secretary, Miss Thurgood, who then notarized the lease, both
18 signatures.
19

MR. WICKER:

Your Honor, is there any need at this

20 point to identify the lease that's been admitted as an
21 exhibit?
22

THE COURT:

23

Q

No.

I don't believe so.

(By Mr. Wicker)

Insofar as the promise of

24 Mr. Fischer that you've testified to, why did you not get
25 that promise in writing?
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A

Well, he said it would take place within a six

month period, by the end of December, 1979.

I expected it

to take place, and we would have executed a lease within
that period.
Q

Would Watkins & Faber have executed the renewal

lease for space in the Newhouse Building without the promise
of the additional space?
A

No.

MR. WICKER:

If we make take an aside at this point,

Your Honor, the rest of our testimony would go to the idea
as to

whether, when December, '79 came to pass, the space

was not offered, why at that time Watkins & Faber did not
file some sort of action to get the space or take a specific
action at that time.
THE COURT:

Well, all we are talking about now is we

are doing this proffer to determine whether or not Mr. Faber1
testimony is admissible, and that's all we are talking about.
We are talking about only the conversations that he had with
Fischer and Swinton.

So if that concludes your direct exam-

ination on that point, we will allow Mr. Chai to cross.
Q

(By Mr. Wicker)

Mr. Faber, were there any more

conversations with Mr. Fischer or Mr. Swinton that bear on
the oral promise of adjacent space?
A

Well, I had talked with Mr. Swinton prior to that

a number of times.

This would be before the end of June,
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*-> *

(Discussion off the record.)
MR. WICKER: Your Honor, at this point this is all the
questions I have of Mr. Swinton.
THE COURT:
MR. CHAI:

You may cross-examine, Mr. Chai.
Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHAI:
Q

I've got kind of a sore throat.

So if you don't

understand what I say, tell me.
h

I do, too.

Q

Mr. Swinton, you've never worked for SCM Land

Company, have you?
A

No.

Q

SCM Land Company was not involved at the time

these conversations with Mr. Fischer about release of Suite
606 took place?
A

No.

Q

The statement you heard from Mr. Fischer that

you referred to earlier in the hall, you recall what we are
talking about here?
A

Yes.

Q

Didn' t Mr. Fischer say that when I.M.L. moved

foe would let Watkins & Faber have that space?
A

Yes.
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1

Q

I.M.L, never moved/ did they?

2

A

Not to my knowledge.

3

Q

And you never told Watkins & Faber that if they

4

stayed you would evict I.M.L. from the sixth floor to give

5

Watkins & Faber the space?

6

A

I did not.

7

Q

And Mr. Fischer in your presence never said that?

8 I

A

Not in my presence.

9

Q

This additional space that you indicated

10

Mr. Fischer spoke about, how long was that space supposed

11

to be available?

12

A

I am sorry?

I didn't get the question.

13

Q

The additional space other than 606 for Watkins

14 & Faber, did Mr. Fischer ever say how long they could have
15 that space when it was leased?
16

A

(No response.)

17

Q

Do you understand my question, sir?

18

A

No.

I don't know that he did.

Are you referring

19 to when they got the additional space how long they would
20 have it?
21

A

Yes.

22

A

No.

I think that would have

been negotiated

23 at the time they took it over.
24

Q

And Mr. Fischer in your presence never indicated

25 who would pay for any remodelling costs that were necessary?
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1

during that conversation?

2

A

3 J

Q

Yes.
What was said?

P
5

AhctJ

M r . Fischer asked me if I was ready to sign the

lease, and I said, "No, not unless we have a promise of the
< r

i

.

.

.

.

.

. . . .

•

•

•

•

•

•

-

6 I space next door."
ft I

'-I

'

i

i

•

'

-

-

•

•

-

And he said that that was no problem,

I I.

7 [ x that he would promise the space next door.
8

We walked down, and in fact went in the offices

9

of I.M.L. on the corner.

10

of the Newhouse Building.

11

about a little partition across the interior hall in the

12

I.M.L. space.

13

That would be the northwest corner
We looked at the space, talked

We talked about a place where we could put a

partition; that is, an entry partition, across the main hall
i

i

14 I on the sixth floor so that would be the entry into Watkins
15

& Faber space when new space was given to u s .

16

Q

17

rental rates?

18

A

19

Did you discuss anything more

Yes.

in regard to

He said it would have to be at the going

rate, and I said that would be fine.

I asked him whether

20 I that would b e , and he said, "I.M.L. is on a month-to-month
21 [ tenancy.

They are going to be moving to the eleventh floor

22

shortly, and you can have that space at that time."

And I

23

said, "Well, I have to have a definite time as to when we

24

would have it."

25

were sharing an office

Because we had attorneys at that time who
'cause we just didn't have enough
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space.

We needed three more, and I told him and Mr. Swinton

that.
Mr. Fischer said that we could have the space
-

—

pn the end no later than December 31st, 1979.

—

—

—

—

-

—

-

—

—

—

—

•

—

—

•

I said okay.

But for some reason, and I can't recall the reason now, we
did not go into my office at that time.
MR. CHAI:

However, --

Your Honor, I would object.

hefs answered the question.

I don't believ^

He's answered the question

earlier.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Wicker)

Do you have any recollection of

any later conversations with Mr. Fischer?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

When did that occur?

A

That occurred on July the 9th, 1979.

Q

Where did that conversation take place?

A.

It took place in my office.

Q

Who was present?

A

Mr. Swinton, Mr. Fischer, Jim Arrowsmith.

He's

a partner in the law firm of Watkins & Faber.
Q

Would you in substance tell us what was said

during that conversation?
A

Yes. We talked about the space next door, talked|

about I.M.L. moving, basically the same thing that occurred
in the prior conversation, and Mr. Fischer said that I —
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1

or, Watkins & Faber —

2

31st, 1979.

3

»

could have that space by December

I told him that at that point in time was very

4

important to m e .

5

to come, and we already had people sharing what was then our

6

supply room as an office.

7

okay, only on that basis will I execute the lease.

8

We had hired a new associate who was due

He said that was find and I said

I executed the lease and took the lease out to

9

the front office where my secretary w a s .

She notarized both

10

Mr. Swinton's signature and my signature, and M r . Fischer

11

and I shook hands and he walked out, and M r . Swinton and

12

M r . Fischer and my secretary were all present at that time.

13

And I think M r . Arrowsmith was there.

14
15

Q

Would you have signed the lease if he had not

made the promise of additional space?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Why did you not get that promise of additional

18

space in writing?

19
20
21

Because it was going to take place in less than

six months*

the eleventh floor.
* - i

22

The I.M. L. was5 proceedi]rig with a remode lling on
I had been up there a number of times

ii

and I was peirsonally acquai nted with Mr. Glenn Goodr ich, the

23 •vice; president of I.M.L., a nd he and I talked about it on a
\II

24 number of occasions,
25

It appeared that the' move was going to be made,
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